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JUDGMENTS RELATIVE TO PATTERNS: HOW TEMPORAL SEQUENCE 
PATTERNS AFFECT JUDGMENTS AND MEMORY 
Abstract 
Six experiments studied relative frequency judgment and recall of sequentially 
presented items drawn from two distinct categories (i.e., city and animal). The 
experiments show that judged frequencies of categories of sequentially encountered 
stimuli are affected by certain properties of the sequence configuration. We find (a) a 
first-run effect whereby people overestimated the frequency of a given category when 
that category was the first repeated category to occur in the sequence and (b) a 
dissociation between judgments and recall; respondents may judge one event more 
likely than the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Specifically, the 
distribution of recalled items does not correspond to the frequency estimates for the 
event categories, indicating that participants do not make frequency judgments by 
sampling their memory for individual items as implied by other accounts such as the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the availability process model 
(Hastie & Park, 1986). We interpret these findings as reflecting the operation of a 
judgment heuristic sensitive to sequential patterns and offer an account for the 
relationship between memory and judged frequencies of sequentially encountered 
stimuli. 
 
 
Keywords: temporal-sequence patterns, frequency judgments, categorization, 
memory 
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We often attempt to understand and make inductions about temporal sequences of 
events (e.g., busy and quiet business days, people’s good and bad moods, sunny and 
rainy days). A long history of research analyzes how people reason about the 
processes underlying sequences and how they anticipate individual events in a 
sequence (see reviews in Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton, Dent & 
Chater, 2009; Oskarsson, van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009; Sedlmeier & 
Betsch, 2002). Extensive research has also investigated memory for - and judgment of 
- the frequency of events encountered in temporal sequence (cf. Brown, 1997; Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979, 1984). Sensitivity to the frequency of events is crucial for judgments 
and decisions concerning uncertain payoffs or threats. However, very little research 
has explored if and how the ordering of different sorts of item in a sequence affects 
judgments and choices about those items. The goal of this article is to address this 
lacuna: we gather evidence that simple strategies effectively exploit sequence 
properties to compensate for the processing-capacity limitations underlying memory 
and judgment. 
Previous research has investigated different frequency estimation strategies 
(Brown, 1997). For example, when judging the frequency of some sort of event, 
participants might retrieve and count instances of the event (enumeration) or rely on 
memory assessment, for example by using an ease of retrieval heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973; 1974). Indeed, several studies suggest that the judgments of 
frequency of experienced events are made according to the ease with which 
instances/occurrences can be brought to mind (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Hertwig, 
Pachur & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Crucially, both 
enumeration and memory assessment strategies imply the expectation of a direct 
relationship between memory and judgment. 
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Other accounts, related to the dual-processing theory of automatic and controlled 
processing (e.g., Schneider & Chein, 2003; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), propose that 
frequency information is automatically encoded with minimal demand on attentional 
resources (Zacks & Hasher, 2002), independently of ability to subsequently recall 
individual instances. In support of this view studies of the judged frequency of stimuli 
have established both that people are highly sensitive to the frequency with which 
events occur and that frequency information appears to be processed with little effort 
or constraint by cognitive-capacity limitations (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Such 
theories can be read as implying that memory for individual events and judgment of 
their frequency might be empirically dissociated. 
Here we present evidence that, in order to judge frequency, people can make use of 
a capacity saving heuristic which, unlike availability, does not depend on recall of 
individual events. We develop our characterization of this approach later in the paper 
but essentially it assumes that people note simple patterns in sequences of stimuli to 
estimate the frequency of different types of stimuli. A number of strands of research 
are consistent with the idea that the recognition and identification of stimuli and the 
judgment of their attributes may be influenced by strategies that refer to previous 
stimuli in a temporal sequence. 
Several prominent cognitive theories of the identification and perceptual 
categorization of stimuli (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) assume that 
people judge attributes of events (e.g., perceptual stimuli) by reference to stored 
individual exemplars of those events in memory. Nonetheless, there are findings 
consistent with the idea that the ordering of different sorts of item in a sequence 
affects absolute judgments and memory (e.g., Haubensak, 1992; Parducci, 1965; 
Parducci & Wedell, 1986). Research on recognition (Medin & Bettger, 1994) has 
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established that the presentation order in which a series of events is experienced has a 
measurable influence on recognition judgments for categories of items; specifically, 
recognition accuracy for a set of items is enhanced if successive stimuli are similar to 
each other rather than different. Recent research also shows that the preceding items 
in a sequence can affect judgments of a single subsequent stimulus, supporting the 
claim that judgments of properties of stimuli (i.e., loudness and brightness) are made 
relative to their current context and are not in any sense absolute (Lockhead, 1992, 
2004; Stewart & Chater, 2002; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002, 2005). Accordingly, 
we test the assumption that judgments are relative by examining whether sequence 
patterns induce measurable biases in judgment. Specifically, in this article, we 
investigate the theoretical case and the empirical case for one possible strategy by 
which people might estimate frequency without remembering individual items. We 
explore evidence for the possibility that people may use a frequency estimation 
strategy that utilizes information about the sequence pattern. The rationale for this 
idea is based on the assumption that, in making frequency judgments, people are 
constrained by information-processing and memory limitations and hence have a 
propensity for strategies which minimize cognitive load. A possible strategy fitting 
this requirement is to exploit simple patterns or characteristics of the sequence that 
may be indicative of frequency (cf. Chater, 1996). 
One potential source of information about the relative frequency of the elements in 
a sequence is the presence of runs - repetitions of types of stimulus in a sequence
1
. 
The appearance of a run of a particular stimulus type is indicative of the hypothesis 
that the repeated stimulus type is more frequent than other non-repeated types. For 
example, across a wide range of sequences varying in the relative frequency of their 
elements, one would be entitled to assume that, when one encountered a run of one 
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type of stimulus, that stimulus type was likely to be more preponderant in the 
sequence.  
In short, our suggestion is that, in the interests of cognitive economy, people note 
the category of outcomes exhibiting the first run in the sequence and then 
provisionally assume this to be more frequent. As a function of this inference, 
monitoring of subsequent events in the sequence would be accorded less attentional 
resource; hence, the strategy makes a quick estimate, trading accuracy against effort 
(cf. Johnson & Payne, 1985). Of course, for those sequences where the category with 
greater relative frequency is not signalled by the first run, there will be error. 
There is evidence that, in their efforts to anticipate future events, people develop 
expectations about sequences by monitoring emerging patterns - including runs (e.g., 
Ayton & Fischer, 2004). If judgments of frequency are informed by the sequence 
configuration, rather than by consulting memory for the individual items, it follows 
that judgment of the frequency of types of item in a sequence and a respondent’s 
recall of the number of individual items of each type in the sequence could be 
dissociated. Such a finding would be inconsistent with those theories which predict 
that frequency is assessed according to the ease with which instances/occurrences can 
be brought to mind (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Hertwig, et al, 2005; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
In this article, we test the notion that judgments of the frequency of types 
(categories) of previous stimuli encountered in a sequence may be made without 
recollecting individual items in the sequence; instead, people may note simple 
patterns in the sequence in order to infer the relative frequency of types of stimulus. 
 
 
JUDGMENTS RELATIVE TO PATTERNS 7 
 
Summary of Experiments 
In order to analyze people’s ability to judge the relative frequency of stimuli 
experienced in sequence, we have developed a frequency identification task where 
participants make judgments of binary-category frequency (where binary categories 
are defined by stimulus variation in, e.g., shape, color or tone). Although our focus on 
binary sequences is illustrative, many sorts of complex event can be conveniently 
treated as binary outcomes (Oskarsson et al., 2005). Six experiments explore the 
hypothesis that frequency judgments, across different perceptual modalities are 
influenced by the presence of certain configurations of sequences that do not 
influence free recall. Specifically, we investigate how the presence of the first run of a 
stimulus type affects judgments of the relative frequency of the different types of 
stimuli in a sequence (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5).  Experiment 6 investigates 
whether memory for individual sequence items is dissociated from judgments of their 
relative frequency.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate whether judgments of the frequencies of 
stimulus categories in a presented sequence depend on the pattern of events within the 
sequence. We used sequences comprising two categories of stimuli occurring in equal 
proportion, but randomized their order, so we could subsequently investigate how the 
varying characteristics of the sequences affected estimation of the relative frequency 
of the two categories. Specifically, we examined a variety of sequence characteristics 
(such as the number of runs, the length of the first run, the length of the last run and 
the length of the sequence - see Appendix 1) to explore whether they influenced the 
estimated frequency of occurrence of the category of stimuli. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were seventy-eight students (32 female, 46 male) from City University 
London and University College London. Mean age was 22 (SD = 3.07). They took 
part individually and each received payment of £3. 
Stimuli and Equipment 
One set of thirty stimuli was produced by generating fifteen different checkerboard 
patterns in each of two colors (see Figure 1) such that we had 15 red and 15 green 
stimuli; a second set of forty two stimuli was similarly produced by generating 21 
checkerboard patterns reproducing each pattern in red and green versions.  One group 
of participants (n = 46) viewed the first set of thirty stimuli sequentially one at a time; 
a second group of participants (n =32) viewed the second set of forty two stimuli 
sequentially one at a time.  For each individual participant a sequence was generated 
by randomly sampling stimuli without replacement from one of the sets of stimuli; 
therefore, each individual stimulus appeared just once in the sequence. Stimuli were 
presented to each participant on a 17-inch screen. A computer program for generating 
and presenting the stimuli was employed.  
Design and Procedure 
The experiment used an independent measures design with response category (red 
or green) as the independent variable. Each respondent was presented with one 
random sequence of red and green stimuli (in equal proportions). The dependent 
variable was the relative frequency judgment of one of the categories (red or green). 
Before presentation of the sequence, participants were instructed that they should try 
to remember as much as possible about the stimuli though no mention was made 
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about the nature of the stimuli other than that they would be viewing checkerboard 
patterns. 
Before the experimental trials began, two example stimuli - one sampled from 
each category (red and green checkerboards) - were presented sequentially to 
participants for a self-paced period, up to a maximum of 5 seconds. Example stimuli 
were used again in the main presentation. During presentation of the experimental 
trials, respondents were not required to make any explicit judgments of the stimuli; 
presentation of each stimulus was again self-paced via the computer keyboard and 
there was no limit on how much time participants could spend observing each 
stimulus. No interval was given between the participants’ key press and the 
appearance of the next stimulus.  
Respondents were presented with one sequence of stimuli and then, immediately 
after the sequence had been presented, they were explicitly asked, via a visual 
message on the computer screen, to make one judgment of the frequency of one of the 
stimulus categories experienced in the sequence as a percentage. The target category 
was systematically varied so half the time it was red and green for each sequence. If 
participants were accurate in their judgment, then their responses should be 50% - the 
actual frequency of the two categories (red and green checkerboards).  
Results and Discussion 
All statistical tests reported in this article used a significance level of .05 unless 
indicated otherwise. The effect of response category (red or green) was not 
significant, t (76) = 1.58, p > .05. Correlation and regression analysis were conducted 
to establish the effect of sequential patterns on frequency judgment. After controlling 
for response category, we computed correlations of judged frequency with 11 
sequence characteristics related to the first run, 11 sequence characteristics related to 
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the last run, and sequence length (see Appendix 1).  With respect to the first run, nine 
sequence characteristics were significantly correlated with judged frequency: first-run 
category (r = .48, p < .001), the length of the first run category (r = .38, p < .001), the 
number of runs of the first-run category (r = .48, p < .001), the number of runs of the 
non-first-run category (r = .48, p < .001), the number of single instances of the first-
run category (r = .39, p < .001), the number of single instances of the non-first-run 
category (r = .40, p < .001), the number of single instances of the non-first-run 
category before the first run (r = .25, p < .05), the average run length of the first-run 
category (r = .46, p < .001), and the average run length of the non-first-run category 
(r = .48, p < .001). Note that some of these correlations are contingent on other 
correlations, but sequence characteristics were not perfectly correlated. For example, 
given an equal number of stimuli of both categories, a higher number of single 
instances of the first-run category implies a higher number of single instances of the 
non-first-run category. The remaining 14 characteristics including the 11 
characteristics related to the last run, and sequence length (see Appendix 1) were not 
significantly correlated with judgment. A stepwise multiple regression analysis
2
 with 
the 11 characteristics was conducted,  in which the predictors were not entered by 
human design, but by a statistical algorithm, so no bias was introduced by the 
researchers in the selection of predictors. The results demonstrate that only the first-
run category was a significant predictor, F (1, 76) = 23.30, R
2
 = .24, p < .001, and 
therefore the most parsimonious account of the first-run effect. These results indicate 
that people may note simple patterns in the sequence in order to infer the relative 
frequency of types of stimulus. More specifically, the results are consistent with our 
notion of a first-run effect - judgments of relative frequency appear to be determined 
by the presence of the first run of a stimulus type and motivate our subsequent 
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experiments in which the characteristics of the first run are experimentally 
manipulated and their effect on frequency judgment observed for a range of different 
kinds of stimulus.  
In Experiment 2 we investigate the generality of the first-run effect by testing for 
its occurrence in sequences differing in length, length of first run, number of first 
runs, starting position of the first run, type of stimulus (tone, colour, shape) and 
category of the first run. Rather than using random sequences we systematically 
designed sequences that enabled us to infer the influence of specific properties of the 
sequence on frequency judgments. 
Experiment 2A 
Experiment 2A was designed to investigate whether we could observe the first-run 
effect in a different modality; specifically, we examined how judgments of the 
relative frequencies of two categories of auditory stimuli in a sequence depend on the 
pattern of events within the sequence. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were ninety-six students (55 female, 41 male) from City University 
London and University College London. Mean age was 22 (SD = 4.48). They took 
part individually and received a payment of £3. 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Two sequences each comprising 28 simple auditory stimuli - 14 “high” and 14 
“low” sine-wave tones per category - were used in this experiment. For the low 
category, the tones varied in frequency between 300 Hz to 320Hz; for the high 
category the tones varied in frequency between 640Hz to 683Hz. Within each 
category, tones varied in pitch - each tone was 0.5% higher in frequency than the tone 
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immediately lower in frequency, and thus, within each category, the tones were 
equally spaced on a log-frequency scale. One sequence consisted of a pattern where 
the first run (repeated type of stimulus) was comprised of low tones and the other 
sequence consisted of a pattern where the first run was comprised of high tones. 
The main features of both sequences were that (a) there were equal numbers of low 
and high stimuli and (b) the sequential order of low and high stimuli followed the 
pattern shown in Table 1. For both sequences, the particular stimuli from each 
category (high or low) were randomly sampled without replacement from the set of 
stimuli comprising each category, each individual tone frequency appearing once in 
the sequence. As shown in Table 1, the first run in the sequence appeared after the 
first single stimulus in the sequence and consisted of a run of seven stimuli. A 
computer program for generating and presenting the stimuli was employed. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment used a 22 independent measures design. The first independent 
variable was the pitch of the category with the first run, with levels low and high (see 
Stimuli and Equipment above). Each respondent was presented with one of two 
different sequences of stimuli - either a sequence where the first run was comprised of 
high tones, or a sequence where the first run was comprised of low tones (see Table 
1). The second independent variable was the response category for the relative 
frequency judgment - respondents were asked to judge the relative frequency of just 
one of the two types of stimulus - with two levels: high and low. The dependent 
variable was the frequency judgment of one of the categories (high or low). 
Before presentation of the sequence, participants were instructed that they should 
try to remember as much as possible about the stimuli though no mention was made 
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about the nature of the stimuli other than that they would be listening to low and high 
tones.  
In advance of the experimental trial, two example stimuli - one sampled from the 
mid-range of each category - were presented to participants for a self-paced period, 
up to a maximum period of 5 seconds. During the experimental trial respondents were 
not required to make any explicit judgments of the stimuli; presentation of each 
stimulus was again self-paced via the computer keyboard and there was no limit on 
how much time participants could spend listening to each stimulus. As each tone 
lasted until a participant responded to initiate the next tone, the duration of each tone 
was determined by the respondent. After the participants had responded there was a 
500-ms pause/interstimulus interval (after the offset of the tone) before the next trial 
began. Participants were presented with one sequence of stimuli and then, 
immediately after the sequence had been presented, they were explicitly asked, via a 
visual message on the computer screen, to make one judgment of the frequency of 
one of the categories of stimuli events experienced in the sequence and to indicate the 
proportion as a percentage. If participants were accurate in their judgment, then their 
responses should be 50% - the actual frequency of the two categories (low- and high-
frequency tones).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows that, for both low-frequency and high-frequency stimuli, the mean 
estimates of the proportion of the first-run category were greater than 50%; for the 
other (non-first run) category the mean estimates were smaller than 50%. In this 
experiment and all subsequent experiments (except in Experiment 6), analyses of 
variance were conducted to test the main effects of the category of the first-run (e.g., 
high or low) and the category respondents judged (first-run or non-first run) and their 
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interaction effect
3
. Because none of these effects were significant, we collapsed the 
data across these factors to simplify assessment of the judgments. The category 
containing the first run was estimated (mean value, SD) as occurring with a frequency 
of 58.5% (12%) - significantly greater than the actual frequency of 50%, t (47) = 
4.77, very large effect size r = .57, p < .001; the other (non-first run) category was 
estimated (mean value, SD) as occurring with a frequency of 43.5% (8%) - 
significantly less than the actual frequency of 50%, t (47) = 5.49, very large effect 
size r = .63, p < .001.  
The results from Experiment 2A are consistent with our conjecture that the pattern 
of experienced simple perceptual stimuli affects people’s judgments.  The first 
repeated type of stimulus affected participants’ frequency identification; although the 
actual frequencies of the two categories from which stimuli were presented were 
equal, respondents judged that the category corresponding with the first run was more 
preponderant than the non-first run category. We call this phenomenon the first-run 
effect. 
We speculate that the first-run effect reflects the operation of a judgment heuristic 
that, unlike availability, is not dependent on recall of individual events; thus, a person 
attempting to infer the relative frequency of events within binary sequences could use 
the first run as a simple heuristic method for judging the relative frequency of the 
different categories. As we noted above, such a strategy would have the dual virtues 
of generating judgments with some validity whilst requiring minimal cognitive 
resources.  
Experiment 2B 
Experiment 2B was also designed to establish whether judged frequencies of the 
stimulus categories depend on the pattern of simple sequence characteristics. As 
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before, we expected a first-run effect but we used different sequences than those used 
in Experiment 2A - this experiment uses an increased number of stimuli (42) and 
systematically varied the length of the first run. 
Method 
The method was similar to that of Experiment 2A.  However, there were 21 “high” 
and 21 “low” simple auditory stimuli per category (low-category range: 300 Hz to 
331 Hz; high-category range: 640 Hz to 707 Hz). Each of the four sequences that 
were used comprised three runs, and the first and last run were from the same 
category. The experiment used a 2 (category with the first run)  2 (length of the first 
run: 6 or 15)  2 (response category for frequency judgment) independent measures 
experimental design (see Table 1). One hundred and twelve undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from City University London and University College London 
took part in the experiment. Ages ranged from 18 to 30 years (68 female, 44 male), 
with a mean of 23 years (SD = 3.14). 
Results and Discussion 
As with Experiment 2A, Table 1 shows that mean estimates of the percentage of 
the first-run category were greater than 50% and mean estimates of the percentage of 
the other, non-first run, category smaller than 50%. The category containing the first 
run was estimated  as occurring with a frequency of 61% (SD = 12%) - significantly 
greater than the actual frequency of 50% t (55) = 6.79, very large effect size r = .68, p 
< .001; the other (non-first run) category was estimated as occurring with a frequency 
of 42% (SD = 8%) - significantly less than the actual frequency of 50%, t (55) = 7.23, 
very large effect size r = .70, p < .001. The results from Experiment 2B, accordingly, 
provide further evidence for our conjecture that the pattern of experienced simple 
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perceptual stimuli affects people’s judgments of frequency; again the first run 
affected participants’ frequency judgments. 
Experiment 2C 
Experiment 2C was designed to confirm the influence of experienced patterns on 
participants’ judgments by using a different type of stimulus. The method was similar 
to that of Experiment 2A, but visual rather than auditory stimuli were used. 
Furthermore, the sequence structure was somewhat different from that used in 
Experiments 2A and 2B; here the first run consisted of a run of seven stimuli and 
appeared after two single stimuli (see Table 1). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in this experiment were sixty-four students (36 female, 28 male) from 
University College London and City University London. Mean age was 22 (SD = 
3.44). The students took part individually and received a payment of £3. 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Twenty-eight visual stimuli, 14 red and 14 green checkerboard patterns per 
category, were used in this experiment and presented one at a time to each participant 
on a 17-inch screen. Two types of binary sequence were used, one sequence consisted 
of a pattern where the first run was green checkerboards and the other sequence 
consisted of a pattern where the first run was red checkerboards (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1).  
Design and Procedure 
The experiment used a 2 (color category of first run)  2 (response category for 
frequency judgment) independent measures design. Each respondent was presented 
with one of two different sequences of stimuli - either a sequence where the first run 
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was of red checkerboards, or a sequence where the first run was of green 
checkerboards. The dependent variable was the frequency judgment of one of the 
categories (red or green). Stimuli of the first-run category were presented after two 
single stimuli in the sequence. Otherwise, the procedure was identical to that used in 
Experiment 2A. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants overestimated the frequency of the category containing the first run 
(M = 59%; SD = 9.5%) - significantly greater than the actual frequency of 50%, t (31) 
= 4.97, very large effect size r = .74, p < .001; the other (non-first run) category was 
underestimated (M = 43.5%; SD=9.5%) - significantly less than the actual frequency 
of 50%, t (31) = 3.82, large effect size r = .57, p < .001 (see Table 1). The results 
from Experiment 2C therefore provide evidence for (a) our conjecture that the pattern 
of events within a sequence affects people’s judgments and (b) the existence of the 
first-run effect. Participants failed to judge the categories accurately and the bias 
corresponded with the presence of the first run.  The results of the experiment are 
consistent with the predicted patterns of over- and underestimation of actual 
frequencies; specifically, participants overestimated the category with the first 
repeated type of stimulus and underestimated the other category. 
Experiment 2D 
The results from Experiment 2A, 2B, and 2C are consistent with our conjecture 
that the pattern of experienced simple perceptual stimuli affects people’s judgments.  
Participants’ judgments were influenced by a pattern of stimuli - the first-run effect. 
Experiment 2D further investigated the robustness of this phenomenon by using a 
different type of visual stimulus - geometrical figures - and a different sequence 
pattern; here the sequence contained an equal number of runs of each category, the 
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first run comprised eleven stimuli and occurred after three single stimuli (see Table 
1). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four students (38 female, 26 male) from the University of Warwick and 
University College London participated voluntarily in this study. The students took 
part individually and received a payment of £3. Mean age was 21 (SD = 2.28). 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Twenty-eight visual stimuli, geometrical figures - circles and triangles - were used 
in this experiment (see Figure 2), presented one at a time to each participant on a 17-
inch screen. The stimuli were created as pairs of identical patterns (see Figure 2).  
Two types of binary sequence were used. One sequence consisted of a pattern 
where the first run was circles and the other sequence consisted of a pattern where the 
first run was triangles (see Table 1). In contrast to Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C, the 
two categories had the same number of runs. 
Design and Procedure 
Similar to Experiments 2A and 2B, Experiment 2D used a 2 (category of first run) 
 2 (response category for frequency judgment) independent measures design. The 
dependent variable was the frequency judgment of one of the categories (circle or 
triangle). Participants were tested one at a time in laboratory cubicles. Sixteen 
participants took part in each experimental condition. The procedure was the same as 
that used in the preceding experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
Experiment 2D confirmed that judgments of frequency are influenced by simple 
sequence characteristics in the task. The results of Experiment 2D, when the number 
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of single stimuli at the beginning and at the end of the sequence was increased and 
those stimuli were geometrical figures, are consistent with the findings of 
Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C.  The category containing the first run was overestimated 
(M = 57%; SD = 8.5%) - significantly greater than the actual frequency of 50%, t (31) 
= 4.42, very large effect size r = .62, p < .001; the other (non-first run) category was 
underestimated (M = 44.5%; SD = 8%) - significantly less than the actual frequency 
of 50%, t (31) = 4.34, very large effect size r = .61, p < .001 (see also Table 1).  
The results of Experiments 2A-2D consistently demonstrate a judgment bias in the 
frequency identification task; specifically, the sequencing of categories, in particular 
the first run, influenced participants’ estimates of the frequency of the stimulus types. 
Although both categories occurred equally frequently, the category with the first run 
of stimuli was overestimated and evaluated as being more frequent than the other 
category, which was consistently underestimated. This pattern occurred across 
varying types of stimuli in two different modalities and for sequences of different 
lengths and patterns.  
Thus far respondents in all our experiments were self-paced.  This feature of our 
procedure leaves open the possibility that the first run effect is an artifactual product 
of possible differences in study duration of stimuli rather than due to the sequence per 
se. (We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for pointing out this possibility.) 
Experiments 3A and 3B were designed to exclude this possibility and confirm the 
effect of the first run on participants’ judgments; in this experiment each stimulus in 
the sequence was presented for a fixed duration. 
Experiment 3A 
Experiment 3A used the same stimuli, equipment and design as employed in 
Experiment 2C.  
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Participants 
Participants in this experiment were forty students (29 female, 11 male) from 
University College London and City University London. Mean age was 23 (SD = 
3.52). The students took part individually and received a payment of £3. 
Procedure 
Each stimulus in the sequence was presented for 3 seconds. Otherwise, the 
procedure was as in Experiment 2C. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows that, for both green and red stimuli, the mean estimates of the 
proportion of the first-run category were greater than 50%; for the non-first run 
category the mean estimates were smaller than 50%
3
. The category containing the 
first run was overestimated (M = 56%; SD = 7%) - significantly greater than the 
actual frequency of 50%, t (19) = 4.08, very large effect size r = .68, p < .001; the 
other (non-first run) category was underestimated (M = 45%; SD = 10%) - 
significantly less than the actual frequency of 50%, t (19) = 2.30, large effect size r = 
.47, p < .05.  
Experiment 3B 
As in Experiment 3A, the duration of each stimulus presented in the sequence was 
fixed. In all other respects the stimuli, equipment and design were essentially the 
same as in Experiment 2D. 
Participants 
Participants in this experiment were forty students (25 female, 15 male) from 
University College London and City University London. Mean age was 21 (SD = 
2.40). The students took part individually and received a payment of £3. 
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Procedure 
Each stimulus in the sequence was presented for 3 seconds. Otherwise, the 
procedure was identical as in Experiment 2D. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows that, for both circle and triangle stimuli, the mean estimates of the 
proportion of the first-run category were greater than 50%; for the non-first run 
category the mean estimates were smaller than 50%
4
. The category containing the 
first run was overestimated (M = 58%; SD = 10%) - significantly greater than the 
actual frequency of 50%, t (19) = 3.60, very large effect size r = .64, p < .01; the other 
(non-first run) category was underestimated (M = 45%; SD = 9%) - significantly less 
than the actual frequency of 50%, t (19) = 2.84, large effect size r = .55, p < .05.  
Experiments 3A and 3B measured the same effects reported in the earlier 
experiments although respondents viewed all stimuli for a fixed period of time.  We 
conclude that the first-run effect reported for the self-paced participants in earlier 
experiments is unlikely to be due to differences in study duration of stimuli. 
 
Experiments 4A and 4B 
The first-run effect found in Experiments 1, 2A-2D and 3A-3B proved to be stable 
over different types of stimulus and variations in the sequence pattern: stimuli 
presented in a sequence affect the relative judgments of frequency; specifically, 
people overestimate the relative frequency of the first repeated category. Experiments 
4A and 4B further investigate the generalizability of this phenomenon by testing 
sequences which differed from those used previously in three more respects: (a) 
unequal proportions of the categories - .37 - for the first run category and .63 - for the 
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non-first-run category, (b) a shorter sequence (of 19 stimuli) was presented, and (c) 
the first run was only two stimuli long, following three single stimuli. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-six students (85 female, 51 male) from University College 
London and City University London, participated individually and received a 
payment of £3. Their mean age was 21 (SD = 2.47). 
Stimuli and Equipment 
In Experiment 4A, 19 stimuli, green and red checkerboards - 7 for the first run 
category and 12 for the non-first-run category, were used in this experiment (see 
Table 2) and presented one at a time to each participant on a 17-inch screen. The 
stimuli were created as pairs of identical patterns (see Figure 1). In Experiment 4B, 
the stimuli and equipment were the same as in Experiment 4A. 
Design and Procedure 
In Experiment 4A, a 22 independent measures design was used for sequences 
with a first run, with independent variables category of the first run (levels: red or 
green) and category of the frequency estimate (levels: red or green). It is important to 
note that the category of the first run was always the one with the smaller proportion 
(.37).  In Experiment 4B,we used a 22 independent measures design with sequences 
created by a random process ignoring the presence or category of the first run, with 
independent variables color of category with the highest frequency (levels: red or 
green) and category of the frequency estimate (levels: red or green). As in Experiment 
4A, in Experiment 4B one of the categories was presented with a proportion of .37 
and the other category with proportion of .63. This was done because summary 
statistics across participants will average out any effects of the first run cue, thus 
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giving an estimate of how accurate people are in general .The dependent variable was 
frequency estimate. The procedure for both 4A and 4B was the same as that used in 
the preceding experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
The first-run effect established in Experiments 1, 2A-2D and 3A-3B was replicated 
in Experiment 4A, even though the experiment used unequal proportions of the two 
stimulus categories. The category containing the first run was overestimated - 
significantly greater than the actual frequency of 37%; the non-first run category was 
underestimated - significantly less than the actual frequency of 63% (see Table 2). In 
Experiment 4B the categories were not over or under estimated (see Table 2). In sum, 
Experiments 4A and 4B demonstrated that the first-run effect occurs even when the 
first run consists of only two stimuli (following three single stimuli in the task) and 
even when the first-run stimulus category is less frequent than the non-first-run 
category. 
Experiment 5 
Extant research on primacy and recency effects indicates that, with a list of 
objects, participants are likely to remember items at the beginning and end 
(Anderson, 1965; Brown, 1958; Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Miller & Campbell, 1959; 
Peterson & Peterson, 1959) of a series better than items presented in the middle of the 
series. Accordingly, Experiment 5 was designed to examine whether the first run 
affects relative judgments of frequency, even when that run occurs in the middle of a 
sequence, following ten alternating stimuli (green or red checkerboards). 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were one hundred and twenty (77 female, 43 male) from University 
College London and City University London. Mean age was 21 (SD = 2.68). They 
took part individually and received a payment of £3. 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Thirty stimuli, green and red checkerboards - 15 green and 15 red stimuli per 
category were used in this experiment (see Figure 1) and presented one at a time to 
each participant on a 17-inch screen. As in Experiments 1, 2C, 3A, and 4 the stimuli 
(checkerboards) were created as pairs of identical patterns (see Figure 1). The first ten 
stimuli in the task were alternating categories - red and green checkerboards followed 
by the category with the first run presented in the middle of the sequence (see Table 
2). 
Design and Procedure 
A 22 independent measures design was used for sequences with a first run, with 
independent variables category of the first run (levels: red or green) and category of 
the requested frequency estimate (levels: red or green). In addition, two control 
conditions were included which varied in color of requested frequency estimate 
(levels: red or green) but with sequences created by a random process and where we 
disregarded the presence or category of the first run. The procedure was the same as 
that used in the preceding experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
The category containing the first run was overestimated (M = 58.5%; SD = 10.5%) 
- significantly greater than the actual frequency of 50%; the other (non-first run) 
category was underestimated (M = 44%; SD = 8.5%) - significantly less than the 
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actual frequency of 50%, with no significant results for the control conditions when 
the sequences were randomly generated (see Table 2). In sum, the results of 
Experiment 5 demonstrate that the first-run effect occurred even when the first-run 
occurred in the middle of a series of stimuli - and even when a second run of the 
alternative category occurred at the end of the sequence, which, given recency effects 
in memory, might have been expected to be more prominently represented than the 
first run. 
Experiment 6 
Previous research based on the availability process model (Hastie & Park, 1986) 
and the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1974) has suggested that, 
because judgments are based on memory for items, judgments of item frequency are 
dependent on memory for those items and hence there will be a correlation between 
memory and judgment of items. However, our findings above suggest the possibility 
that, across a wide range of sequences, patterns of events could affect judgments 
(frequency estimation) and memory (free recall) differently. Accordingly, in 
Experiment 6 we looked for evidence of a dissociation between memory (free recall) 
for the experienced items and judgments of their relative frequency. Plainly, such a 
dissociation would not fit theoretical accounts assuming a direct relationship between 
memory and judgment measures (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). In Experiment 6, we tested this assumption by using word stimuli that varied 
in category membership of two categories (animal and city) and a free-recall task that 
followed the frequency estimation task. 
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Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six City University London and University College London undergraduate 
and postgraduate students (60 female and 36 male) were recruited for the experiment. 
They were paid £4 and took part individually. Mean age was 22 (SD = 3.13). 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Thirty word stimuli -15 city names and 15 animal names - were used in this 
experiment (see Table 2) and presented one at a time to each participant on a 17-inch 
screen. The first run occurred after two initial stimuli and was comprised of seven 
stimuli. 
Design and Procedure 
A 3x2 independent measures design was used. The independent variables were 
type of sequence (levels: animal as the first-run category, city as the first-run 
category, and a control randomly generated series) and category of the frequency 
estimate (levels: city and animal). As in Experiments 4B and 5 the control sequences, 
where we elicited judgments but disregarded the presence or category of the first run, 
served to measure the influence of the stimuli and requested judgment category. The 
dependent variables were frequency estimates for one of the categories and recall for 
both categories. The procedure was similar to that used in the preceding experiments, 
with one exception. After estimating the frequency of one of the categories, and in 
contrast to the preceding experiments, participants were then asked to recall as many 
stimuli as possible from the task (free recall); then, finally, so that we could check the 
stability of the frequency judgments, they again estimated the frequency of one of the 
categories. 
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Results and Discussion 
In order to simplify analysis of participants’ frequency estimates/judgments, we 
collapsed the data across first-run categories (animal and city) for the first and second 
estimates. The category containing the first run was overestimated (M =59%; SD = 
9%) - significantly greater than the actual frequency of 50% in the conditions with 
animal or city as the first-run category, with no significant difference for the control 
random sequences where we elicited judgments but disregarded the presence or 
category of the first run  (see Table 2).  
Four 3 (sequence)  2(category of first estimate) ANOVAs were conducted: (1) for 
the first frequency estimate, (2) for the second frequency estimate, (3) for the recall of 
the category city, and (4) for the recall of the category animal. The effect of sequence 
was significant for first frequency estimate, F (2, 90) = 11.00, large effect size 2  = 
.18, p < .001, but the effect of category of first frequency estimate, F (1, 90) = 2.87, p 
> .05, and the interaction effect were not, F < 1.  Tukey’s HSD tests showed that both 
first run conditions differed from the random condition, p < .001 (see also Table 2).  
For second frequency estimate, the effect of sequence, F (2, 90) = 8.44, large effect 
size 2  = .14, p < .001, and category of first frequency estimate, F (1, 90) = 4.76, 
small to medium effect size 2  = .03, p < .05, were significant, but the interaction 
effect, F < 1, was not.  Tukey’s HSD tests demonstrated that both first-run conditions 
differed from the random condition, p < .01 (see also Table 2).  
Despite the effects of both sequence type and category on frequency judgments we 
found no analogous effects on recall. For recall of cities the effect of sequence was 
not significant, F (2, 90) = 2.85, p > .05, and neither was the effect of category of first 
frequency estimate, F (1, 90) = 1.05, p > .05, and the interaction effect, F < 1. The 
effect of sequence was also not significant for recall of animals, F < 1, and neither 
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was the effect of category of first frequency estimate, F (1, 90) = 1.34, p > .05, or the 
interaction effect, F < 1.  
The effects of sequence on frequency judgment and the lack of any corresponding 
effects on recall indicate a dissociation between frequency identification and recall. 
Moreover, further evidence for this dissociation comes from an analysis of 
correlations of performance across participants. The frequency estimate was stable, 
ICC = .89, F (95, 95) = 8.66, p < .001.  In addition, across participants, the correlation 
between the item recall of the first-run category and that of the non-first-run category 
was high, r = .60, p < .001, but correlations between the two measures of frequency 
estimate and the two measures of recall were low, -.15 < r < -.04, all p > .05. 
Combined analysis of the non-random conditions shows that the correlation between 
recall of the first-run items (of the first-run category) and the first frequency estimate 
of the first run was negligible, r = -.09, p >> .05, as was the correlation between recall 
of the last-run items (of the non-first-run category) and the first frequency estimate of 
the last first run, r = .02, p >> .05. These results, therefore, show no evidence of an 
effect of the first frequency estimate on recall or an effect of recall on the second 
frequency estimate.   
Additional evidence for a dissociation comes from further mixed ANOVA. A 3 
(sequence) x (2) (category of recall) ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect 
F (2, 93) = 3.52, 2  = .01, p < .05, on recall, but the main effects were not significant, 
both F < 1.  t tests showed that the effect of recall category was significant for 
conditions where city was the first-run category t (31) = 2.80, large effect size r = .45, 
p < .01, approaching significance when animal was the first-run category, t (31) = 
1.58, medium effect size r = .27, p  = .12, and not significant in conditions for random 
series, t < 1, r = .07 (see also Table 3). In addition, combined analysis of the non-
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random conditions shows that 20% of variance in the total correct recall of all items 
was explained by the correct recall of the first-run items (of the first-run category), r 
= .45, p < .001, but 64% of variance was explained by the correct recall of the last-run 
items (of the non-first-run category), r = .80, p < .001. These results demonstrate that 
the category of the first run was recalled less than the non-first run category (in the 
case of the category city) or marginally so (in the case of the category animal) and 
that recall of the non-first-run category contributed much more strongly to the total 
recall. These results and the previous results demonstrate that frequency estimates are 
exaggerated for the first-run category, but recall is exaggerated for the non-first-run 
category, thereby indicating a dissociation between judgment and recall. Moreover, 
the results of our experiments indicate a first-run effect for frequency estimate, but 
predominantly a recency effect for recall (given that the last repeated sequence of 
items from the non-first-run category explain almost two thirds of variance in total 
recall and the first-run items only explain one fifth of variance). Therefore, frequency 
judgment does not have the same representational basis as the primacy effect in free 
recall. Rather the findings demonstrate that predominantly a recency effect (rather 
than primacy effect) contributes to free recall. The evidence does not support the 
assumption that frequency judgment is a byproduct of elaborate rehearsal which is 
also supposed to underlie the primacy effect in free recall. 
In sum, Experiment 6 demonstrates that the first-run effect also occurs with word 
stimuli and that the mechanism for frequency identification is different from that of 
memory for presented category members. These findings are consistent with our 
speculation that the first-run effect reflects the operation of a judgment heuristic; thus, 
an organism wanting to infer the relative frequency of events within binary sequences 
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could use the first run as a simple heuristic method for judging the relative frequency 
of the different categories.  
As our participants did not know about the frequency estimation task until after 
they had experienced the sequence it is very unlikely that there was any deliberate 
selection of any heuristic prior to the judgment being made.  Accordingly it might be 
reasoned that, as a result, any heuristic judgment would have to operate on the 
memory for relevant features of the sequence – and that therefore the first run 
category must presumably have some likelihood of being remembered in order to 
influence the judgment.  
However, we do not preclude automatic activation of a heuristic (cf. Hasher and 
Zacks finding that frequency judgment is automatic).  Moreover this does not 
necessarily entail that the information used by the heuristic is retained as an 
accessible memory.  For example, participants may have made the judgment online 
and then forgotten the sequence characteristics they monitored to make the judgment.  
Nonetheless, when we asked respondents after they had experienced the sequences 
which was the first run category they were better than chance at this: the percentage 
of correct identification of the first-run category (77%) was significantly greater than 
50%, 2 (1) = 7.54, p < .05.  Moreover, correctness of identification was independent 
of first-run category, 2 (1) = .26, p > .05. 
Our results show that temporal-sequence patterns influence judgments and 
memory differently. First, there is no evidence that participants use short-term 
representations in their frequency judgments. Second, the first-run effect occurs with 
judgments, but not with recall which - by contrast - shows a recency effect. Third, 
there is evidence for a dissociation between frequency judgments and recall; 
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respondents judged one category of event as more frequent than the other and yet 
recalled more instances of the latter. 
General Discussion 
 The results from six experiments show that representations of the frequencies of 
stimulus categories depend on the pattern of events within a sequence. The results 
provide evidence for a first-run effect across different sequence properties, and 
psychophysical characteristics of the stimuli employed in the experiments. 
Specifically, we find that people overestimate the frequency of a given category of 
event when that category is the first repeated category to occur in the sequence - a 
phenomenon we call the first-run effect.  
We also found evidence for a dissociation between judgments and recall 
(Experiment 6); respondents may judge one category of event as more frequent than 
the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Moreover, we found that 
frequency judgments and memory were biased by different configurations in 
sequences.  Specifically, frequency judgments were influenced by the first run - while 
memory for individual events in the sequence was better for later items in the 
sequence.  
This dissociation between recall of the experienced items and judgments of their 
relative frequency (frequency judgment) does not fit established theoretical accounts 
assuming a direct relationship between memory and judgment measures, for example 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973, 1974) availability view of frequency judgment and 
Hastie and Park’s (1984) availability process model. While other demonstrations of 
dissociations between recall and judgment have been cited as evidence against an 
availability view of frequency judgment (e.g., Hock, Malcus & Hasher, 1986), we 
interpret the dissociation observed here - in conjunction with the first-run effect - as 
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evidence for the operation of a rather different heuristic for judged frequency which, 
instead of using recall of individual events, uses simple patterns in sequences of 
events. 
We see some similarities between our attempt to understand frequency judgment 
and research designed to investigate context effects on identification and 
categorization of individual stimuli presented in sequential order.  According to 
exemplar models of perceptual classification (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1986), people represent categories by storing individual exemplars in 
memory and classify objects on the basis of their similarity to these stored exemplars, 
implying that identification is achieved using long-term stored representations of 
characteristics. Thus, exemplar models suggest that humans make judgments 
according to a similarity principle. Furthermore, both exemplar-based models  and 
decision-bound models (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986) - the most prominent 
theories in categorization - share a common representational assumption, namely that 
memory of the absolute characteristics of previously perceived stimuli are available 
when people classify new simple stimuli or make a judgment.  
However, studies of identification and categorization conducted over the past five 
decades have revealed people’s inability to classify or precisely estimate perceived 
objects independently of their preceding context (Garner, 1954; Hampton, Estes & 
Simmons, 2005; Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Lockhead, 2004; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Parducci, 1965; Stewart et al., 2005). These studies 
demonstrate that people’s judgments (e.g., identification, categorization, 
psychophysical properties) of stimuli are strongly influenced by the corresponding 
aspects of preceding stimuli.  
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Lockhead’s theoretical review (2004) has demonstrated that the classical laws of 
psychophysics (Fechner’s, Weber’s and Stevens’ laws) are not general because the 
context (e.g., physical characteristics) of stimuli affects judgment. According to what 
can be described as the relative approach, this is because information-processing 
constraints oblige judgments to be made with very limited information. Accordingly, 
only the immediately preceding context is available; long-term representations are 
either unavailable, cannot be formed or remain unused (Stewart et al., 2005). 
Our findings are consistent with the idea that people’s frequency judgments are 
achieved in a similar fashion insofar as they are made without recollecting individual 
items in the sequence and they are influenced by specific properties of the sequence 
configuration. In particular, we propose a simple strategy that draws minimal effort 
from our limited-capacity attentional mechanism whereby respondents use the first 
run as a cue to frequency. Our experiments demonstrated evidence for such a strategy 
that uses information about the sequence pattern for relative frequency estimation. 
While other authors have proposed that frequency information is automatically 
encoded with minimal demand on attentional resources (Zacks & Hasher, 2002) our 
proposal does not address the issue as to whether the process underlying this strategy 
is automatic or controlled (“System One” or “System Two”), though - plainly - this is 
open to investigation. However, our proposal does offer a clear specification of a 
process by which judgments of the frequency of types of event might be made 
without relying on memory of specific events.  
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Appendix 1 
Examples of sequences used in the frequency-estimation task  
 
N Sequence Characteristic Identification of sequence characteristic Value of 
sequence 
characteristic 
1 First-run category RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR RED 
2 Last-run category RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR GREEN 
3 Length of the first-run RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 4 
4 Length of the last-run RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 2 
5 Number of runs (first-run category) RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 4 
6 Number of runs (non-first-run 
category) 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 2 
7 Single stimuli (first-run category) RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 3 
8 Number of single stimuli (non-first-
run category) 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 4 
9 Number of single stimuli (first-run 
category) before the first run  
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 1 
10 Number of single stimuli (non-first-
run category) before the first run  
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 1 
11 Number of single stimuli (first-run 
category) after the last run  
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 1 
12 Number of single stimuli (non-first-
run category) after the last run  
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 0 
13 Number of runs (last-run category) RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 2 
14 Number of runs (non-last-run 
category) 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 4 
15 Number of single stimuli (last-run 
category) 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 4 
16 Number of single stimuli (non-last-
run category) 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 3 
17 Average run length of first-run 
category 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 3 
18 Average run length of non-first-run 
category 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
5.5 
19 Average run length of last-run 
category 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
5.5 
20 Average run length of non-last-run 
category 
RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
3 
21 Charateristic 9 + Charateristic 10 RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
2 
22 Charateristic 11 + Charateristic 12 RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
1 
23 Sequence length RGRRRRGRGRRGGGGGGGGGRRRRGRRGGR 
30 
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Footnotes 
1
 In this paper we use the term “run” when at least two consecutive occurrences of 
the same category appear in a sequence; accordingly, a single occurrence is not 
considered a run. 
 2
 The purpose of this analysis is not to address multicollinearity, but instead 
analyses for each predictor variable whether the additional amount of variance that 
each of the remaining predictor variables would explain in the dependent variable is 
statistically significant. 
3
 In Experiment 2A and the following experiments, in order to make frequency 
estimates made in non-first-run conditions equivalent with those made in first-run 
conditions for the purpose of conducting statistical tests, each estimate in the former 
conditions were replaced with 100% - estimate. 
4
 Confidence intervals are not presented for the four experimental conditions 
because, given a sample size of n = 10 in each experimental condition, these would be 
underpowered. However, the statistical tests that were conducted were not 
underpowered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and confidence intervals (Experiments 2 and 3) 
Note. Numbers are respondents’ estimates of the percentage of stimuli in the first-run 
and the non-first-run categories. 
 
  First-run 
category 
Non-first-run 
category 
Experiment Sequence Mean 
 (SD) 
 (CI.95) 
Mean 
 (SD) 
 (CI.95) 
2A LHHHHHHHLHHLHHLHHLLLLLLLLLHL 58 
(12) 
(53; 63) 
43 
(7) 
(40; 46) 
2A HLLLLLLLHLLHLLHLLHHHHHHHHHLH 
 
59 
(12) 
(54; 65) 
44 
(9) 
(41; 48) 
2B LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHLLLLLL 
 
60 
(12) 
(53; 66) 
43 
(7) 
(39; 47) 
2B LLLLLLHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
 
58 
(10) 
(52; 63) 
44 
(8) 
(38: 48) 
2B HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLHHHHHH 
 
62 
(13) 
(55; 70) 
41 
(9) 
(36; 46) 
2B HHHHHHLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH 
 
62 
(12) 
(55; 69) 
40 
(9) 
(35; 45) 
2C GRGGGGGGGGGRRGRRGRRGRRRRRRRG 
 
56 
(7) 
(53; 60) 
44 
(8) 
(40; 49) 
2C RGRRRRRRRRRGGRGGRGGRGGGGGGGR 
 
61 
(12) 
(54; 67) 
43 
(11) 
(36; 49) 
2D CTCTTTTTTTTTTTCCCCCCCCCCTCTC 
 
57 
(9) 
(52; 61) 
44 
(7) 
(40; 47) 
2D TCTCCCCCCCCCCCTTTTTTTTTTCTCT 56 
(8) 
(52; 60) 
45 
(9) 
(39; 49) 
3A GRGGGGGGGGGRRGRRGRRGRRRRRRRG 
 
56 
(7) 
45 
(9) 
3A RGRRRRRRRRRGGRGGRGGRGGGGGGGR 
 
57 
(7) 
45 
(12) 
3B CTCTTTTTTTTTTTCCCCCCCCCCTCTC 
 
57 
(9) 
46 
(8) 
3B TCTCCCCCCCCCCCTTTTTTTTTTCTCT 58 
(11) 
44 
(10) 
Table 2 
Sequences and test of frequency estimate against the actual proportion (Experiments 4, 5 and 6) 
 
Experiment  
 
Sequence 
 
First-run category  
 
Judged category 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
r 
Experiment 4A GRGRRGRGRGRGGGGGGGR Red (37%) Red (37%) 45 9 3.43 16 <.01 .65 
Experiment 4A GRGRRGRGRGRGGGGGGGR Red (37%) Green (63%) 54 8 -3.99 16 <.01 .71 
Experiment 4A RGRGGRGRGRGRRRRRRRG Green (37%) Green (37%) 44 9 3.02 16 <.01 .60 
Experiment 4A RGRGGRGRGRGRRRRRRRG Green (37%) Red (63%) 55 9 -3.54 16 <.01 .66 
Experiment 4B  Random Red (37%) 39 6 1.04 16 .31 .25 
Experiment 4B  Random Red (63%) 60 8 -1.49 16 .15 .35 
Experiment 4B  Random Green (37%) 35 6 -1.25 16 .23 .30 
Experiment 4B  Random Green (63%) 62 10 -.41 16 .68 .10 
Experiment 5 RGRGRGRGRGRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGG Red (50%) Red (50%) 59 12 3.36 29 <.01 .61 
Experiment 5 RGRGRGRGRGRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGG Red (50%) Green (50%) 45 9 -2.64 29 <.01 .52 
Experiment 5 GRGRGRGRGRGGGGGGGGGGRRRRRRRRRR Green (50%) Green (50%) 58 9 4.00 29 <.01 .68 
Experiment 5 GRGRGRGRGRGGGGGGGGGGRRRRRRRRRR Green (50%) Red (50%) 43 8 -4.36 29 <.001 .71 
Experiment 5  Random (50%) Green (50%) 52 11 .78 29 .45 .18 
Experiment 5  Random (50%) Red (50%) 51 9 .65 29 .52 .15 
Experiment 6 CACCCCCCCACCACCACCAAAAAAAAAAAC Cities (first estimate)  
a
 60 8 6.77 29 < .001 .77 
Experiment 6 ACAAAAAAACAACAACAACCCCCCCCCCCA Animals (first estimate)  
a
 59 9 5.93 29 < .001 .73 
Experiment 6  Random  
b
 50 12 -0.20 29 .85 .04 
Experiment 6 CACCCCCCCACCACCACCAAAAAAAAAAAC Cities (second estimate)  
a
 57 10 4.03 29 < .001 .59 
Experiment 6 ACAAAAAAACAACAACAACCCCCCCCCCCA Animals (second estimate)  
a
 59 9 5.41 29 < .001 .70 
Experiment 6  Random  
b
 49 12 -0.50 29 .62 .09 
Note. Means are estimated percentages of the categories. 
a
Estimated percentage of the category with first run. 
b
Estimated percentage of the response 
category 
Table 3  
Descriptives for recall by recall category and first-run category (Experiment 6) 
   First-run category 
Category of recall City Animal Random 
City    
 M 52 64 59 
 SD 20 19 21 
Animal    
 M 60 59 60 
  SD 20 17 21 
 
Note. Numbers are percentages of correct recalls.  
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Figure 1. Examples of red and green stimuli. 
 
Stimuli from the category red      Stimuli from the category green  
 
                          
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENTS RELATIVE TO PATTERNS 45 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of triangles and circles stimuli. 
 
Stimulus from the category circles  Stimulus from the category triangles 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
